Kallacha
Dubbi
August 14, 2007
In my previous writing entitled “TPLF and
Tigrean Identity Politics” dated May 25,
2007, I expressed a view that Tigrean
nationalism is overtly discriminatory, and
it is therefore distinguished by negative
manifestations of the Ethiopian integrative
power. Instead of uniting multi-ethnic
Ethiopia, the Tigrean Peoples Liberation
Front (TPLF) leadership has antagonized
them, and as such, it has excluded even
Tigreans from mainstream Ethiopian political
discourse. In this follow up, necessitated
by email feedbacks I received, I intend to
provide some evidence without encumbering
the reader with too much detail that such
data would otherwise require.
My previous argument leads to a conclusion
that the negative identity formation in
which a group (TPLF) defines itself and also
others in terms of what it is not, according
to a famous sociologist, tends to lead into
a "pathological situation of internal
violence." This has occurred on a large
scale in the Balkans, Sri Lanka, or the
Middle East. The situation in Ethiopia is an
even more fitting example with acutely
rising consequences. Tigrean discrimination
ignores individual merits based on the
victim’s ethnic background, and this serves
as a stifling factor for development,
killing ideas in a poor country that
requires mobilizing all its brain capacities
to get rid of the ravaging poverty.
My previous view also suggests that Tigrean
discrimination has paradoxically played a
very important role of coalescing the
discriminated people, pulling together
victims who share the same abuse to a united
powerhouse capable of undermining or perhaps
even toppling the discriminator. Oromos,
Somalis, Sidamas, and Amharas, etc. are
united in wanting to dethrone the TPLF. In
other words, even a negative integration,
integration that is achieved for a reason of
shared abuse - threats, hatred, tortures,
arrests, and killings is integration of some
sort. This natural coalition of the
oppressed is as strong as it can effectively
resist political opportunism as well as
TPLF’s corruptive infiltration. There is
tangible evidence, that creation of a
country-wide united national opposition
front to this Tigrean domination is targeted
by infiltrators from the TPLF dominated
regime. But the creation of a broad-based
unity has its own weak points that expose it
to such manipulations.
The weakest link
The Ethiopian political intolerance,
exceptionally violent and intense in its
makeup, is nourished by delusional tradition
that borders with compulsive disorder. By
and large, it assumes that every human being
with opposing opinion, every political group
with a dissenting view, is an enemy. This
intolerance characterizes the individual
activist’s manner so profoundly, that one
can observe its manifestations in coffee bar
debates, at community gatherings, and even
at scholarly meetings. This is in major part
the legacy of the Ethiopian Peoples
Revolutionary Party (EPRP), the weakest link
in the creation of a broad-based opposition
against Tigrean domination, i.e., a hazard
for political progress in the country.
In a familiarly condescending tone whose
authorship must have a thing or two to do
with EPRP mentality, one wrote, “The theory
of the nation which decomposes Ethiopia by
weaving the myths (emphasis mine) of
Tigreanism, Eritreanism, Oromoism and so on
goes counter to the core experience of the
people, …” After reclaiming Eritrea, an
independent country and replacing the well
established Ethiopian myth with his own, the
author attempts to guard the mythical
“framework” by delivering another punch to
its contents: “There can be no compromise on
the Ethiopian and African framework for
citizen expression and engagement.” The
author forces all the Ethiopian cultural and
ethnic diversities to either become
Ethiopians or Africans of his personal
definition of certainly chauvinistic
preeminence, or face a wrath of his verdict
and imagination – no compromise, we are told
in no uncertain terms.
So, vaguely articulated malice of EPRP’s
ideology still permeates through the deeds
and words of the now senior or middle-aged
activists who commenced politics in the 70s
as infantile children. Their politics never
stopped growing, but it grew crook! In the
70s, in a bizarre combination of feudal
tradition with Marxism, the EPRP offered
nothing else to the Ethiopian political
roundtable other than winning by killing or
dying, even when in its opposition stood a
well-armed national army pronouncing its
sure demise. There was no compromise then as
now. Blinded by emotional ambition, traits
of which are still glaring among its rank
and file, the children were too young to
fathom the essence of a military balance and
too confused to comprehend the impact of a
generation’s death. The military junta was
driven insane by their obnoxious and
unflinching ambition, and as a result, the
junta passed a collective death verdict on
the generation. This in part allowed the
military to keep political power for one
more decade, leaving behind a scar of
historical magnitude. In this sense, the
EPRP and the TPLF have little to distinguish
them from Khmer Rouge, except that the TPLF,
also a teen army that grew to power without
growing to the society, is now terrorizing
Ethiopia whereas the EPRP resides in old
Diaspora minds as a political paranoia. They
do share concealed hate and love for each
other; they can’t go against each other,
that can’t go for each other either. It is
sad to see that neither the politics nor the
social evolution of the last thirty years
offered any cure to the survivors of the
lost generation of Ethiopia that continue
diffusing discord throughout all the
political establishments of the region.
There is little doubt that most of the
destructive vectors and inward fighters in
all political fronts and organizations can
be traced to this futile ideology in a
resistive or adaptive form. Their relentless
propaganda for the unity of Ethiopia on one
hand, and equally relentless objection to
the unity of Oromos, Amharas, Somalis etc.
when not on their own sadistic terms on the
other, their objection to the very idea of
the Alliance for Freedom and Democracy (AFD),
is a synopsis of their fixation on winning,
with extremely poor judgment of their
capacity that would enable them to win. By
betraying its own mission and stated goals,
the EPRP is acclaimed to be the weakest link
of the Ethiopian political opposition
against Tigrean domination, and therefore
the creation of a better tomorrow for the
region.
TPLF’s Strength
Facing a disgruntled Ethiopian opposition
forces is the TPLF, an organization that has
an exceptional talent in further
disgruntling opposition forces. The TPLF has
two strong virtues that link it to the
Ethiopian political power and shape its
capacity to destabilize the opposition. They
are its a) military, and b) economy.
a) The military: Strictly
speaking, the Ethiopia armed forces are
Tigrean no less than the TPLF is Tigrean.
The following list makes this argument
abundantly clear.
Ministry of Defense
-
Commander of Ethiopian armed forces -
Melles Zenawi (Tigrean)
-
Defense Minister is a non-Tigrean, but
this position is constitutionally manned
by a civilian, not a military person
- Chief
of Staff - Samora (Mohamed) Yunis (Tigrean)
-
Department of Training - Major General
Taddese Wored- (Tigrean)
-
Department of Logistics and
Administration - Major General Gezahi
Abera - (Tigrean)
-
Department of Operations - Brigadier
General Gebrzgiabher Mebrhatu (Tigrean)
-
Department of Military Intelligence-
Brigadier General Yohannes (John) Gebre
- Meskel
- (Tigrean) …. Recently appointed as
Deputy Commander of Central Command.
This Department will also be commanded
by head of operations Brigadier General
Gebrezgiabher Mebrhatu (Tigrean).
-
Commander of the Air Force - Brigadier
Molla H. Mariam (Tigirean)
Under the Ministry of Defense there
are 5 Ethiopian Army Commanders.
-
Northern Command (HQ Mekele) - Major
General Seare Mekonnen (Tigrean)
- North
Western Command (HQ Baher Dar) -
Brigadier General Abraham Gebre Mariam (Tigrean)
-
Special Army Command (HQ Dessie-Bure
Front) - Birgadier General Teklai
Ashebir (Tigrean)
- South
Eastern Army Command (HQ Harar) -
Brigadier General Seyum Hagos (Tigrean)
-
Central Army Command (HQ Shire
Indasilassie) - Major General Taddese
Wored (Tigirean - Agaw). Recently,
Brigadier General Yohannes G. Meskel
also Tigrean.
The Ministry of Defense has 28
Division Commanders.
- All
but one are Tigreans
Division Commands have 106 Regiments.
- 98% of
the Regiment Commanders are Tigireans
It can be safely argued therefore, that
there is no Ethiopian national army but
Tigrean.
b) The economy: The
Ethiopian economy is controlled by two
large conglomerates:
- The
Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of
Tigray (EFFORT)
- The
Ethio-Saudi AI-Amudi-family - Midroc
Ethiopia
Of interest to my ongoing argument is
EFFORT. We will return to Midroc at
another opportune time.
In 1978,
the TPLF created the Relief Society of
Tigray (REST), a financial umbrella
organization of the TPLF, which acted as an
NGO despite, headed by a TPLF Central
Committee member. It collected donations
from the international community and
channeled it to the TPLF, playing a key role
in the survival and ultimate victory of TPLF
over the Derg.
After the rise of the TPLF to power in 1991,
REST was formally registered with the
governmental Relief & Rehabilitation
Commission in Ethiopia as an NGO. As the
TPLF’s financial backbone, it continued
enjoying the state protection, and the
restructured organization emerged as the
richest “NGO” in the continent. In the
summer of 1995, about four years after it
took control of central power in Ethiopia,
the TPLF established a stronger peer for
REST - the Endowment Fund for the
Rehabilitation of Tigray (EFFORT). Sources
suggest that EFFORT started its business
venture with a lofty investment volume of
about 2.7 billion birr, - then just under US
$1 billion (currently $1 US is about 9
birr).
Through EFFORT, the TPLF has considerably
diversified its economic activities and
expanded its outreach even to foreign
countries. The European financial maneuver
of the TPLF is based in UK where family
members are trained and placed in key areas
of Ethiopia’s financial institutions. In
some cases, they are assigned to a now
growing number of internationalized
affiliates co-owned or owned by EFFORT, such
as the Tower Trading Company (TTC) – a
London-based TPLF owned company mandated
with money laundering.
New companies continue to emerge, fully or
partly owned by EFFORT through an intricate
system of shares and investments. By
controlling key growth areas, EFFORT has
become the soul of the country's economy:
agriculture (Hiwot Mechanized Agriculture),
industry (Almeda Textiles Manufacturing Sc.,
Mesfin Industrial Engineering SC.),
import-export (Guna Trading House),
transport (Trans-Ethiopia SC.), insurance
(Africa Insurance SC.), mining (Meskerem
Investment SC.), communications (Mega-Net
Corporation), banking (Wegagen Bank), just
to mention some. Clearly, TPLF’s business
enterprises cover numerous activities
including textile, chemicals,
pharmaceutical, and food industries. They
also cover major service industries such as
banking, insurance, transportation,
printing, advertising, land developing,
import/export, construction, mining, leather
products, and farming.
EFFORT is divided into several sectors
directed by members of the TPLF Central
Committee, like Abadi Zemo for industrial
activities, Arkebe Oqubay Mitiku for
construction and transportation, and
Tewodros Hagos for mining. The individuals
may be moved around, but no non-Tigrean is
appointed to EFFORT. In fact, no non-TPLF
Tigrean is appointed to the ranks of EFFORT.
Strategic positions of the Federal
government that generate large amounts of
cash are also led by Tigreans of EFFORT who
hold multiple offices. For example, Foreign
Minister Seyoum Mesfin is chairman of
Ethiopian Air Lines, chairman of the Mugher
Cement Factory, chairman of the Ambo Water
Factory, chairman of EFFORT, and
deputy-chairman of the TPLF at the same
time. The more trusted individuals are
usually offered the more strategic
positions.
Although EFFORT is strictly controlled by
the TPLF, it is not the only entity owned or
controlled by high-ranking TPLF officials or
favored Tigrean citizens. For example,
although EFFORT controls WEGAGEN Bank, the
TPLF encouraged the creation of DEDEBIT
Credit and Savings Institution,
headquartered in Meqele and administered by
the local government of Tigray. The bank has
numerous financial links with other TPLF
controlled businesses of the country.
DEDEBIT, as an extension of Rural Credit
Program, acquired a near total monopoly over
credit to rural areas, mostly farmers. The
financial monopoly over rural Ethiopia has
serious political ramifications. In the
early 2000s, the main source of the bank was
interest from fertilizer. Farmers were
identified, registered, and forced to make a
down payment of 25% on the price for the
amount of fertilizer. The Bank estimated the
amount of fertilizer the farmer supposedly
needed. A credit agreement was written with
each farmer, and after six months, the bank
collected the debt from the farmers with 15%
interest.
Business in Tigray is completely closed to
non-Tigreans, and all walks of Tigrean
businesses are exclusively owned by EFFORT
or the local Tigrean government. For
example, the trading company GUNA has a near
monopoly in sesame and incense wholesale in
Tigray whereas TRANS Ethiopia carries all
goods designated as relief.
The TPLF also benefits EFFORT by ordering
free transfer of funds from government
accounts, often under a bogus claim of
services that TPLF institutions offered to
the public. It allows free flow of goods in
the name of EFFORT, without customs and
taxes, but EFFORT is allowed to compete with
for-profit businesses of the country through
its tentacle bureaus. Thus, Moseb Cement
factory was built with public expenditure at
a cost of 1.5 billion birr, and a Textile
factory in Adwa at 1.2 billion. However, the
incomes from these public investments are
fully controlled by the TPLF through EFFORT.
EFFORT also makes extensive use of the
credit opportunities offered by the
state-owned Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE)
and other financial institutions controlled
by the government. The generous provision of
credits by CBE to EFFORT is clearly
politically influenced and based upon
directives issued by the TPLF controlled
government of Ethiopia. When EFFORT defaults
in the payment of loans CBE provides
relieving credit, obviously upon directives
from the Ethiopian government. In some
cases, millions of birr loans obtained by
EFFORT are unlawfully delayed or even
cancelled. In a widely publicized case a few
years ago, the Vice-Governor of CBE
overruled an earlier decision by the credit
department of CBE not to grant 40 million
birr credit to SUR Construction, a
subsidiary of EFFORT. There is no way
escaping the conclusion that the loan was
made possible by political intervention from
the TPLF regime.
As an almost sole beneficiary of state
contracts, EFFORT’s income continues to grow
exponentially. For example, during the Ethio-Eritrean
war, EFFORT became the financial wing of the
war. MESFIN Engineering supplied water,
fuel, and vehicles. TRANS-Ethiopia supplied
trucks, and SELAM Bus was in charge of
transporting militia. The income from the
war propelled these companies to powerful
monopolies of the country in their
respective business domains.
EFFORT has now become a self-contained
economic state operating on the call of the
official government, formally serving the
personal appetite of state officials, a
phenomena witnessed nowhere in the world.
Its assets are protected federally, and its
under-the-table contracts are enforced by
TPLF’s iron fisted militias. It has a
favored access to government as well as to
foreign aid contracts with profitable
niches, dominating joint ventures with
domestic and foreign investors. One of the
strategic alliances is with Amoudi’s Midroc,
which supplies the TPLF with billions of
birr through investments. Midroc buys
natural resources of the South including
gold and other precious stones from the TPLF
with cash, and service contracts at these
sites go back to EFFORT.
At a policy level, the Financial Sector
Steering Committee (FSSC) serves as an
umbrella institute for justification of fund
transfers, creating the legal framework for
supporting even poorly performing EFFORT
auxiliaries, or channeling funds to the
Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic
Front (EPRDF) cash institutes. EPRDF is a
bogus amalgam of Fronts populated with non-Tigrean
renegades, created and dominated by the TPLF.
FSSC defines policies and strategies for
banks, appoints board of directors and
executives for the banks, and routinely
monitors their operations. Thus, the FSSC
oversees all government banks, and has full
power over their activities. Prime Minister
Meles Zenawi chairs this committee. It is a
public knowledge that he personally mandated
EPRDF companies: Guna, Ambassael, Dinsho,
and Wando to take over the sugar company
when the plant was privatized. Interestingly
Ato Sebhat who owns Guna, Ato Bereket who
owns Ambassel, Ato Girma who owns Dinsho,
and Ato Kassu who owns Wando are members of
FSSC, and some of these same individuals
seat on the Board of CBE that financed these
companies. As a result, all privately owned
enterprises competing for the privatization
of the plant, Star, Abeba co. etc. were shut
out of the competition.
The EFFORT companies are reported to owe
billions of birr to Ethiopian banks. In
fact, most of the EFFORT companies would not
survive without government protection. In
one case, CBE, the Construction and Business
Bank, and the Ethiopian Development Bank
collectively loaned 1.7 billion birr to
EFFORT. According to insiders, the loan has
not been paid to date. The 1.7 billion birr
was distributed to Adigrat Pharmaceutical
Factory, Adwa Textile Factory, Dashen
Brewery, and Mesebo Cement Factory. These
and other EFFORT or EPRDF affiliates
including TESCO, Tikure Abay, Dansho
Transport are constantly in deep financial
crisis.
Although the main focus of this paper is
private business ventures of the TPLF, it
must be noted that Tigray, the TPLF’s home
region has inequitably benefited from
federal funds. For example, a recently
published paper presents comparative welfare
analysis of four Ethiopian regions: Oromia,
Amhara, Southern States, and Tigray. A
2001/2002 data of these regions shows that
42% of children in Tigray are fully
vaccinated, where as the percentage is - 10%
for Oromia, 15% for Amhara, and 11% for
Southern States. Population to physician
ratio is 28,600 for Tigray. This jumps to
60,800 for Oromia, 60,700 for Amhara, and
44,000 for Southern States. Secondary
education enrollment for Tigray is about 25%
(a six-fold increase in just a decade), but
Oromia has 11.6%, Amhara 9%, and Southern
States 11%. According to World Bank report
“Ethiopia Public Expenditure review” the
Federal government never transferred more
than 6% of the country’s cash revenue to the
states, which leaves more than 94% of the
federal budget at the discretion of the TPLF,
appropriation of which is apparent from the
above numbers.
In conclusion, the TPLF has clearly violated
international business rules and practices,
and as a ruling political party, it not only
owns large amounts of properties and engages
in commercial and trading activities whereby
it places competing private sectors in a
hopeless situation, but it also uses this
economic dominance to incarcerate, harass,
dominate, and control political opposition
forces to stay in power. This injustice
justifies continued armed struggle of the
people against the TPLF domination, and
rejection of foreign expeditions to exploit
natural resources of the country on behalf
of the TPLF.
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